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Abstract
Investment activity produces effects on two different economic vari-
ables. On the one hand, it adds to the existing productive capacity, on
the other, it represents a component of demand. What is required for
demand may not be required for accumulation, and viceversa. As a con-
sequence different adjustment mechanisms have been put forward in the
economic literature to make the two aspects of investment compatible to
each other. In all cases, a distinction has been made between the fun-
damentally macroeconomic nature of the demand aspect, and the funda-
mentally microeconomic nature of the capacity-augmenting aspect. This
paper tries to discuss the foundations of a non-perverse adjustment mech-
anism based on the internalisation of the demand aspect of investment.
The adjustment mechanism discussed earlier is based on investment re-
acting to positive or negative excess aggregate demand. Once it is shown
that a collectively efficient equilibrium can be reached even on an entirely
arbitrary basis, one may set out to show that a behaviour which gets
selected in a small population can be easily extended to a large one.
JEL Classification - E12; E22; B52; C73
Key words - Investment; demand; capacity-aumenting; coordination-
rule; evolutionary analysis.
1 Introduction
Macroeconomics is about the behaviour of aggregates. Such aggregates are usu-
ally modelled according to some ad hoc rule or are reduced to the agency of
some representative individual. Alternatively, the behaviour of aggregates can
be modelled as resulting from some repeated interaction among different popu-
lations of individual agents, which ends up with the establishment of a successful
∗Department of Labour Studies, University of Milano, via Conservatorio, 22 - 20122- Mi-
lano. e-mail: luigi.bonaventura@unimi.it
†Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Catania, C.so Italia,
55 -95125- Catania. E-mail: caserta@unict.it
1
rule of behaviour. This kind of evolutionary explanation of macroeconomic reg-
ularities is followed in this paper.
The macroeconomic regularity studied is investment in the transition from
a given warranted growth path to a differently scaled warranted growth path.
The question is not of little importance in the theory of demand-led growth
as it is an instance of the more general problem of the ability of autonomous
demand to determine the path of growth. Starting with Harrod, the problem
has engaged the mind of many economists who have tried to develop models
of equilibrium growth where aggregate demand plays a prominent role. Unlike
the line followed in the existing literature, which has fundamentally used ad hoc
assumptions to accommodate demand in a model of equilibrium growth, the line
followed in this paper suggests an alternative way to accommodate demand.
One of the main problems encountered in modelling demand-led equilibrium
growth is the dual role of investment, as a component of demand as an act of
accumulation. It is not at all obvious that what is required for investment in
one of its role is also required for investment playing the other role. To model
successfully the role of aggregate (investment) demand in the process of growth
that conflict must be resolved. It is suggested here that the conflict might be
resolved through the emergence of a rule of behaviour which becomes established
as the outcome of an evolutionary process. This process illustrates the evolution
of a set of populations by the evolution of their aggregate behaviour: through
time the aggregate behaviour of each population changes, as more successful
strategies replace the less fit ones. This process comes to an end when each
individual member of the population is following the most successful strategy
within the population. Since the proposed dynamics leads to a polarization
of behaviour and since the rule necessary to resolve the conflict between the
two role of investment is a rule of containment, where one population behaves
differently from the other, it is argued here that such a containment can be seen
as resulting from an evolutionary process.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will identify the possible
role of demand in the explanation of growth. Section 3 will illustrate the conflict
between the two roles of investment and the solutions which have been provided
in the literature. Section 4 will pave the way for a different resolution of the
conflict. Section 5 will show the need for an evolutionary dynamics in the
explanation of the studied macroeconomic behaviour. Section 6 will illustrate
the working of the evolutionary dynamics. Section 7 will argue that such a
dynamics can provide a way to model the transition from a given warranted
growth path to another one.
2 Demand-led growth
Textbook growth theory suggests that growth depends primarily on the avail-
ability of productive resources without paying any attention to demand factors.
It is through the accumulation of produced resources that labour can grow more
and more productive with the result that the main limit to growth comes from
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insufficient accumulation. Economies are thus engaged into the problem of al-
locating their income through time but never fail to fulfil their intertemporal
plans. Problems may arise form market imperfections, externalities and the
like but no interference originates from insufficient demand, i.e. no interference
originates from the very simple fact that output must be sold before it is turned
into income. Growth therefore is presented as an unambiguously supply-side
process.
Once such an interference is allowed for, two main consequences follow. At
any given time, output may be lower than its potential level. As a result, accu-
mulation may be different, with an obvious consequence on the path of labour
productivity. The growth path the economy is going to follow is necessarily
different from that it would follow if no demand problem existed. Thus, at any
given time, output is influenced by present and past demand failures. Economies
will be more or less prosperous according to whether demand is not or is capable
of holding output and accumulation in check. In the introduction to a sympo-
sium on demand-led growth, Setterfield (2003) points precisely to this double
impact of demand on economic growth. He recalls that, at any given time, de-
mand affects the degree of utilisation of productive resources, questioning the
usual assumption that in the long run the actual degree tends to the normal
degree of utilisation. He also recalls that a variable aggregate demand implies
a variable investment demand. Hence, the future availability of productive re-
sources is affected by the current degree of utilisation of productive resources.
According to Setterfield a variable aggregate demand may also affect the type
of investment planned and even the availability of financial resources. Thus the
principle of effective demand operates both in the traditional Keynesian fash-
ion, as the main determinant of the level of output relative to existing resources,
and as the main determinant of existing productive resources, which are always
created with the purpose of meeting demand1.
Once the role of demand in the process of growth is recognised a model of
demand-led growth must be put forward. This requires modelling demand and
a mechanism through which demand determines a particular pattern of growth.
In most cases it is equilibrium growth which has been searched for, that is a
pattern of growth where demand and output grow at a constant rate through
time. The literature on growth is full of models which yield an equilibrium rate of
growth as a result of the operation of an independent demand. The component
of demand which has been given a prominent role is clearly investment demand.
The reason why investment demand is accorded a prominent role in the
theory of demand-led growth is because Say’s Law cannot be proved in the
case of investment demand. When investment is a component of demand, it is
no longer true that demand is always equal to supply, as not all supply turns
automatically into demand. Investment demand is not necessarily associated
1The extended operation of the principle of effective demand is advocated in the work of
Garegnani (1978, 1992) and set within the tradition of Sraffian Economics. The general idea
is that the growth of autonomous demand is the main factor behind the growth of productive
capacity. This is made possible by a flexible degree of utilisation of the existing productive
resources.
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to the supply of output, but is independent by its very nature. Once this is
made clear the road is open to modelling investment demand and to studying
its relevance to the process of growth.
Giving prominence to investment demand in modelling demand-led growth
carries with it an important implication. Since investment is both a component
of demand and an act of accumulation, it ends up capturing the full impact
of demand on economic growth. Investment demand failures, therefore, affect
current output but also future output through the effects on the accumulation of
productive resources. Thus investment plays an active dual role in the process
of growth: on the one hand, as a component of demand it must bear a desired
relation to some variable, on the other, as new capacity it must bear a desired
relation to some other variable. It is clear that the reconciliation between the
two roles of investment is the key to a successful development of a model of
demand-led equilibrium growth.
3 Demand-led equilibrium growth
The reconciliation between the two roles of investment has engaged the mind of
many economists, from Keynes to Harrod and Kalecki, from Kaldor to Solow.
What is required for investment as a component of demand may not be required
for investment as new capacity, and viceversa. As a consequence different ad-
justment mechanisms have been put forward in the economic literature to make
the two aspects of investment compatible to each other. In all cases, a distinc-
tion has been made between the fundamentally macroeconomic nature of the
demand aspect, and the fundamentally microeconomic nature of the capacity-
augmenting aspect. Investment is driven by the prospect of profits, but invest-
ment demand in the aggregate is not necessarily compatible with full utilisation
of productive capacity. When this is the case distribution (the rate of profit or
the rate of interest) will change so as full utilisation of productive capacity is
achieved. Adjustment is also possible by means of a variable degree of capacity
utilisation.
The whole story starts with Keynes who, as a matter of fact, did not have
to face any problem of reconciliation between the two roles of investment. In-
vestment in Keynes is only a component of demand; no attempt is made to
develop a model of equilibrium growth. According to Keynes the lapse of time
between the purchase of new capital and its utilisation is usually too long for
investment to be checked in the light of realised results. Once new capital is
installed it is too late to ask whether it was the right thing to do. There is no
point, therefore, in looking for an equilibrium condition for capital; even if it
were realised it would have no relevance for future decisions2.
The story continues with the work of Harrod who, unlike Keynes, tries to
make the rate of growth of demand compatible with the rate of growth of ca-
pacity but cannot specify a mechanism through which this comes about. If the
economy happens to be on the right track, the growth rate of investment demand
2Chick has consistently interpreted Keynes in this light. See for example Chick (1983).
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will create no more nor less capacity than what is required to meet that very
growth rate of demand. However, should the growth rate of investment demand
change for whatever reason, no mechanism would make this new growth rate
compatible with equilibrium growth. This problem is known as Harrod’s knife-
edge and arises from the assumption that investment demand reacts to overall
variations in demand. Since investment is a component of demand the initial
change in the growth rate of (investment) demand will be aggravated, with the
result that a vicious circle is set in motion with no obvious mitigating device.
Thus, in Harrod, the incompatibility between the two roles of investment is
exposed, but not resolved.
Three routes were available to resolve the conflict. The first one was the
extreme one: doing away altogether with investment demand. This route was
taken by Solow who reduced investment to a mere realisation of saving decisions.
Investment is just capital accumulation: equilibrium implies a particular capital-
output ratio and a particular capital-labour ratio. No requirement is fixed for
investment decisions other than that of being equal to savings. Thus Harrod’s
problem is solved through the elimination of the original source of the problem:
no change in the rate of growth of aggregate demand is possible simply because
there is no aggregate demand one can speak of.
The extreme route is not the only one, however. By making one of the two
parameters of Harrod’s model flexible, room is made for investment demand
not to impinge on capital utilisation requirements. These are the routes taken
by Kaldor, who made savings flexible by means of flexible income distribution,
and Kalecki, who made the capital-output ratio flexible by allowing for different
degrees of capital utilisation. The route taken by Kaldor starts from the as-
sumption of differentiated saving propensities and is based upon the variability
of the price level. If the growth rate of investment demand is increased more
savings will be made available by the increase in the price level; if the growth
rate of investment demand is reduced the price level will be reduced to let
consumption compensate for the lack of aggregate demand. The autonomy of
investment demand, therefore, ceases to be a problem as enough savings will be
always available to make a given rate of growth of investment demand possible.
Aggregate demand drives growth but its most typical manifestation, that is, a
variable output, is suppressed.
A variable output, relative to capacity, is not suppressed in the route taken
by Kalecki3. In this approach investment demand is allowed to play its effects
on output but the requirements of capital utilisation are made less stringent. A
change in the rate of growth of investment demand is accommodated through
a change in the degree of capacity utilisation. It is assumed that within the
limit of potential output capital need not be in a given relation to output. Thus
investment demand affects current output and also future output through a vari-
able rate of accumulation of productive capacity, but no particular requirement
is imposed on the utilisation of capital.
3The so-called Kaleckian approach has generated a wide literature on growth. See, for
example, one of the most quoted: Rowthorn (1981).
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The conflict exposed by Harrod finds a resolution in the approaches followed
by Kaldor and by Kalecki. In order to make investment demand play a promi-
nent role in the process of growth, and produce at the same time a stable model
of equilibrium growth, these approaches have had to devise adjustment mecha-
nisms that weaken the requirements fixed in Harrod’s approach4. The question
faced in this paper is whether that conflict can be resolved without weakening
any of those requirement, that is, without requiring other than normal degrees
of capital utilisation and without requiring a variable saving rate.
4 A different route
If we dispense with the previous assumptions of a variable degree of capital
utilisation and with a variable saving rate we are left with an adjustment mech-
anism which is rather perverse. An autonomous variation in the growth rate
of investment demand (or an autonomous variation in the level of investment
demand) will tend to aggravate the initial demand problem: positive excess
demand induces an increase in investment; negative excess demand induces a
reduction in investment. The system will move further and further away from
equilibrium. There might be cases, however, when such perverse effects are mit-
igated or even cases when they are offset completely by opposing tendencies. It
is precisely these cases that this paper intends to investigate further.
For investment to react to demand in a non-perverse way, positive excess de-
mand should, at some point, cease to induce any more investment, and negative
excess demand should, at some point, cease to induce any further reduction in
investment. Later the foundations of a non-perverse adjustment mechanism will
be discussed. The alternative mechanism should be based on the recognition
that reducing investment with negative excess demand and increasing invest-
ment with positive excess demand is not a successful way of reconciling the two
different roles of investment. In the aggregate such a mechanism aggravates
the initial disequilibrium. In that case it becomes impossible to show how an
autonomous variation in demand affects the growth path of the economy. The
crucial question now is the following: is there a possibility that a non-perverse
adjustment mechanism comes into effect, with the result that in the case of
positive excess demand, the increase in investment meets with a superior limit
and, in the case of negative excess demand, the reduction in investment meets
with an inferior limit?
To show that such a mechanism can offer a reconciliation between the two
roles of investment as a component of demand and as accumulated capacity
a very simple story can be told. Let us assume that a Harrodian equilibrium
is disturbed by an autonomous increase in the level of autonomous demand.
What is required in this case is an increase in the scale of the economy without
any change in its long-term rate of growth. If this transition were successful
the role of demand would become apparent in the change in the scale of the
economy. The path of growth could be said to be demand-led. The transition
4See as a recent example of this approach Erturk (2002).
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starts with a positive reaction of investment to the positive excess demand.
However, investment aggravates the initial demand problem. For the transition
to be successfully completed the aggravation of the demand problem should not
give rise to any further increase in investment. The economy should create the
new capacity to meet the recent increase in the level of demand, but should
not be affected by the induced increase in demand which has no autonomous
justification. Similarly, in the case of a decrease in the level of autonomous
demand, investment should be reduced to reduce the scale of the economy,
but no further induced reduction should be allowed. What is necessary, in
both cases, is a containment effect which leads investors to realise that further
investment is not required, in the case of an increase in demand, or that no
further reduction is needed, in the case of a decrease in demand.
In what follows an attempt will be made to provide foundations to such
a containment effect. Unlike the Kaldorian or the Kaleckian ways out of the
problem which are based on the relaxation of a constraint that is external to
investment decisions, here a self-regulating mechanism will be suggested. Since
what is required is that investors coordinate their plans so that not so much
investment is generated in the case of an increase in aggregate demand, and not
so little is generated in the case of a decrease in aggregate demand, a compen-
sating mechanism will be suggested, primarily designed to differentiate investors
plans.
5 A coordination rule
A collective rule of behaviour must be introduced, resulting from a spontaneous
interaction among investors, requiring each of them to react differently to posi-
tive or negative excess demand. A process is also required designed to coordinate
the different investors plans so that an equilibrium can be attained. In the case
of a positive excess demand, for example, investors will increase investment, but
through a process of differentiation of their behaviour overall investment will be
forthcoming in the right amount. How do we explain the emergence of such a
rule of behaviour? Is it possible to explain this rule by resorting to the theory
of rational choice?
The question is not straightforward. It raises some problems especially with
respect to the assumption of agent rationality within game theory. What is at
issue is whether collective choices can be founded on rational individual action.
It is widely acknowledged that it might be difficult to explain the effects of
collective interaction by means of the theory of individual action. In some
cases the assumptions of individual rationality and common knowledge limit
the possibility of a plausible explanation of these interactions.
These types of interaction are commonly considered by game theory and
usually grouped under the heading of coordination games. The main feature of
these games is that of possessing multiple Nash equilibria with a not necessarily
clear Pareto-ordering. In such circumstances and, also, when players cannot
communicate, the assumptions of individual rationality and common knowledge
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do not necessarily allow any prediction of which equilibrium will be selected.
Schelling (1960) uses the concept of focal points to identify the particular Nash
equilibrium most likely to be selected. Focal equilibria are culturally determined,
so they change according to the context in which the interaction takes place.
If two individuals, not living in New York, are meant to meet somewhere in
New York, but cannot communicate, they will probably take the Empire State
Building as a focal point; unlike two new Yorkers who will probably choose
Grand Central Station.
Which equilibrium becomes a focal point is determined by the social and
cultural context of the interaction, i.e. by its past history. In this line focal
points can be considered as stable social conventions resulting from a dynamic
process which through time coordinates individual behaviour (Sugden, 1989).
A convention, by its very nature, is not unique, but represents only one among
many solutions of a game. It is the outcome of an evolutionary process which
builds upon the interaction of many individuals in a long-term dynamics (Bin-
more and Samuelson, 2002). The main feature of these processes is an adaptive
interaction, which means that agents are randomly paired in each period and
they adapt their strategies by means an historic process. A convention is an
equilibrium in which each agent is playing the strategy which she is expected
to choose. But how are expectations formed in case of multiple equilibria?
The evolutionary approach offers a plausible explanation of the dynamics
of the process through which expectations and strategies converge towards a
specific equilibrium. Peyton Young (1998) has emphasized the merits of evolu-
tionary analysis and the reasons why it should be preferred to classical analysis
in the explanation of the emergence of equilibria. A distinguishing feature of
evolutionary analysis is the notion of rationality assigned to individual agents.
Agents look around, acquire information and adapt their behaviour according
to a trial and error mechanism.
The purpose of this paper is to show how, by means of a process of co-
ordination of the plans of individual investors, an equilibrium can be reached
where investors play different strategies. If this equilibrium prevailed the above
mentioned containment effect would be produced. To show all this a model
where individual agents interact with one another is required. The particular
game used, given the nature of the interaction, is a coordination game. Our
model of coordination formation is based on Young’s evolutionary model of
bargaining (Young 1993). The model is bottom-up in the sense that the coor-
dination behaviour emerge spontaneously from the decentralized interactions of
self-interested agents. In each time period two randomly chosen firms interact,
bargaining on the choice of investment. Their behavior, and their aspectations
about others’ behavior, evolve endogenously based on prior experiences.
It can be show that the coordination solution is an evolutionary stable lon-
run behavior and starting from any arbitrary initial conditions, the system will
converge into the two pure Nash equilibria.
The following game (fig. 1) is a pure coordination game, symmetrical in
payoffs. The available pure strategies for each investor are I (invest) and N
(not invest). The associated payoffs are the following: a > 0. The game has two
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strict Nash equilibria (I,N), (N, I) and one in mixed strategies (p∗, q∗), where
each investor plays I with probability p and N with probability 1− p.
I N
I 0 a
N a 0
fig. 1
How does a firm decide what strategy to follow in the previously game?
Instead of assuming equilibrium, we wish to explore the process by which equi-
librium emerges at the aggregate level, from the repeated, decentralized inter-
actions of firms. We can think that the firms follow the history of how the other
firms have played in the past, and choose a strategy for the future that is the
best response to the past play of others. We call this adaptive learning.
6 Adaptive Learning
We begin by studying this question for a population of firms who are indistin-
guishable from one another, but who have different experiences that condition
their beliefs.
Let the population consist of N firms. Each time period consists of (N/2)
“matches”. In each match, one pair of firms is drawn at random from the popu-
lation, and they play the game in fig.1. Every firm remembers the choices - I,N
- played by each of her opponents in the last m periods, where m is the memory
length. The concatenation of all firm memory defines the current state of the
society. Behaviorally, each firm forms its strategy on the opponet’s prior choices,
with the following matching rules; the best response to II is thus N , the best
response to NN is I, and the best response to IN or NI is any combination of
I and N . We take this combination to be: play I with probability 1/2 and N
with probability 1/2. These rules for matching and behavior formation define
a particular social dynamic as a function of the population size N and memory
length m. Notice that it is a Markov process, because there is a well-defined
probability of moving from any given state s to any other state s′ in the next
period.
If S is the finite set of available strategies to firms, and N is the finite
population of firms, then there will be SNm “states of game”. In the simplest
example with N = 2 and m = 2, there are sixteen distinct “states” of the game,
which we label abcd, where each of the letters can be I or N , b is the last move
by firm 1, a is firm 1’s move previous to this, d is the last move by firm 2, and
c is firm 2’s previous to this. For instance, IINI means firm 1 moved I on the
previous two rounds, while firm 2 moved first N and then I.
Ordering the “states of game”; IINN, IIII, IIIN, IINI, INNN, INII, ININ,
INNI, NINN, NIII, NIIN, NINI, NNNN, NNIN, NNNI, NNII, we can now com-
pute the probability of a transition to any other state on the next play of the
game. IINN (and similarly NNII ) is an attractor state in the sense that, once
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it is entered, it stays there forever. The state IIIN goes to the states IINN
and INNN, each with probability 1/2. The state ININ goes to NNNN, NINN,
NNNI, NINI each with probability 1/4. And so on.
We can summarize the transitions from state to state in a 16 × 16 matrix
(generally |Z| = SNm × SNm), call Z the probability transition matrix, and
the dynamic process of moving from state to state is a Markov chain. In our
example, we will assign for any row and column a relative “state”, as follows:
IINN =1, IIII =2, IIIN= 3,..., NNII =16.
Also, if we represent the SNm states by the SNm row vectors {v1, v2, ..., vs},
where v1 = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0), v2 = (0.1, 0, ..., 0), and so on, then it is easy to see
that if we are in the state vi in one period, the probability distribution of states
in the next period is just vi = Z.
If the system starts in state i at t = 0, viZ is the probability distribution of
the state it’s in at t = 1.
viZ = p1v1 + ...+ psvs
Then, with probability pjthe system has probability distribution vjZ in the
second period, so the probability distribution of states in t = 2 is
viZ
2 = p1v1Z + ...+ psvsZ
Similar reasoning shows that the probability distribution of states after k
periods is simply viZk. Thus, just as Z is the probability transition matrix for
one period, so is Zk the probability transition matrix for k periods. To find out
the long-run behaviour of the system, we therefore want to calculate:
Z∗ = lim
k⇒∝
Zk
I trust you understand that this cannot be calculated by hand! However,
there are ways of computing Z∗; for instance, Mathematica the computer al-
gebra software package calculate Zk for larger and larger k , high values of N
(number of firms) and many periods of recall m.
We are interested in the long-run behavior of an ergodic Markov chains. In
particular, we are interested in the behavior of a system that we espect will
attain a long-run equilibrium independent from its initial conditions. Young
(1993) pointed out that for a special class of n-person games adaptive play
converge to a Nash equilibrium. These games have the property that, from any
initial choice of strategies, there exists a sequence of best replies that leads to
a strict, pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In other words, no matter where you
start, you end up in one of the attractors (IINN ), (NNII ), which is a strict Nash
equilibrium in the coordination game. We conclude that the adaptive learning
leads with probability 1 to a Nash equilibrium in which the firms coordinate
themselves differencing their strategies.
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7 The knife edge mitigated
The previous model shows that whatever situation we move from, the adaptive
evolutionary process will lead to an attractor state in a k periods. The pop-
ulation of firms will select itself into two strategies will do one thing and the
other will do the other thing. This final outcome is reached through a process
of trial and error whereby each member of a population adapts her behaviour to
the history of the opponents. The essential idea is to show how an equilibrium
based on coordination behavior can emerge spontaneously from the interactions
of many firms. Due to the self-reinforcing nature of the process, these behaviors
tend to perpetuate themselves for long period of time, even thought they may
have arisen from purely random events and have no a priori justification.
This kind of dynamics can be used to provide the containment effect that is
required in a model of equilibrium growth when the traditional assisting devices
are no longer available, i.e. when neither a variable degree of capital utilisation
nor a flexible distribution are in operation. For that containment effect to
be produced the following conditions are required: (i) when an autonomous
increase in aggregate demand disturbs the warranted growth path, a contained
increase in investment; (ii) when an autonomous reduction in aggregate demand
disturbs the warranted growth path, a contained decrease in investment. This
means that all the populations of firms should not react to the disturbance in an
homogeneous fashion. If all the populations managed to contain their reaction,
the transition to the new growth path would be successful. The idea put forward
here is that such a containment is achieved by a polarization of behaviour: if
one population invests the other should not invest.
The evolutionary dynamics illustrated earlier can give a plausible account
of the process leading to the establishment of a rule of behaviour in the case of
aggregate demand disturbances. By means of a process of trials and errors, firms
establish themselves as belonging to the reacting or to the non-reacting type.
Once the disturbance occurs the polarization of their behaviour is precisely what
is required to ensure a successful transition to the new steady growth path.
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